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Exploring a third-party e-waste
recycling system under the extended
producer responsibility framework
in China
Hua Zhong and Shu Schiller

Introduction
The rapid advance of information technologies has produced a large
amount of waste of electronic and electrical equipment (WEEE). WEEE
or e- waste, refers to old, end-of-life (EoL) or discarded electronic appliances. The world produces 20 to 50 million metric tons of e-waste annually
(Electronics Take-back Coalition 2009), of which China alone contributes
2 million tons. Each year at least 6 million washing machines, 7 million
TV sets, 10 million PCs and 70 million mobile phones are discarded and
the number increases at the rate of more than 10 per cent each year
(Hung 2007), according to the report from the resource and environment
comprehensive utilization department of the State Development and
Reform Commission (SDRC 2006). Discarded electronic products contain
a stew of toxic metals and chemicals such as lead, mercury, cadmium,
chromium and polychlorinated biphenyls (Scott 2007) and cause great
harm to the environment. Recycling and reusing e-waste are thus becoming an increasingly important global issue.
Extended producer responsibility (EPR) is defined as “a policy principle to promote total life-cycle environmental improvements of product
systems by extending the responsibilities of the manufacturer of the
product to various parts of the entire life-cycle of the product, and especially to the take-back, recycling and final disposal of the product”
(Lindhqvist 1992). The ultimate goal of controlling e-waste is minimizing
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the impact on the environment of EoL products. E-waste recycling involves
product and systems design that take EoL products into account. In order
to fully integrate product retirement concerns into design considerations,
it is necessary to gather feedback and internalize costs and data. Although
EPR determines that producers have leading responsibility in this, other
parties, including consumers, retailers, recyclers and governments need to
contribute to this process.

Extended producer responsibility practices
Definition and legislation in different countries
The extended producer responsibility (EPR) concept was first formally
used in Sweden by Thomas Lindhqvist in 1992 in a report to the Swedish
Ministry of the Environment. The Swedish reports further specified how
manufacturers should take responsibility for their products, including
their liability, and their responsibilities in terms of the economic, physical
and information aspects of doing so. In 2000 the European Parliament
passed a directive requiring its member countries to institute EPR programmes for EoL vehicles (Forslind 2005) and an additional directive for
waste electronics and electrical equipment (WEEE) was approved in
early 2003. This is not only a European phenomenon; as, for example,
Japan has also enacted an EPR law covering four large electrical home
appliances (TV sets, refrigerators, air conditioners and washing machines)
(Spicer and Johnson 2004). The USA established a similar system with
variations focusing more on product responsibility, instead of products
themselves. Table 9.1 shows the definitions and explanations of EPR in
respective legislations.
In addition, scholars have explored relevant practices in different regions (such as Sweden, Germany, the USA, Japan and Taiwan) and across
different products (printers, PCs, motor cars and batteries) (Forslind
2005; Hanisch 2000; Lee 2008; Mayers 2005). They reached a consensus
recognizing that EPR policies can actually stimulate product innovation
and environmentally friendly design in reducing the use of materials,
resources and energy by eliminating the use of toxins, extending the useful life cycle, increasing opportunities for the recovery and reuse of products at their Eo and creating new forms of product delivery, such as a
leasing product service system (McKerlie 2006; Nicol and Thompson
2007; Tojo 2001).
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Table 9.1 Definition and EPR legislation in Europe

Legislation

Europe

Japan

USA

WEEE
Restriction of
Hazardous
Substances
Package and EOL
Vehicles

Home Appliance
Recycling Law

Extended product
responsibility
The state of
California
imposed an
electronic waste
recycling fee on
new purchases
of electronic
products with
viewable screens.

Responsibilities
Collection, recycling,
Producers
disposal and
charging the fee
Pay the recycling fee
Consumers
and insure the
integrity of
e-waste
Government Pay a part of fee of
collection,
disposable or
make policy of
fiscal subsidies of
EPR organization

Complete recycling
rate index
Should inform the
retailer when
home appliances
retire
Enforce legislation

In EPR system,
producer,
supplier and
customer take
on responsibility
for the
environmentally
appropriate
disposal of
e-waste

Extended producer responsibility modes of implementation and
capital operation
Depending on how thoroughly it is implemented and how much the government is involved, there are three models of EPR implementation. The
first is the voluntary model, that is, producers take measures to decrease
the impact of their products on pollution. For example, enterprises devise
a take-back plan and recycle their products at their EoL. The second is
the enforcement model, as obligated by the government, in the government forces manufactures to recycle their products. The third is the economic model, realized by incentives such as an ecology tax, pre-fee for
recycling, and deposit return (Wanggan 2006).
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In terms of capital operations, in Europe, Korea and Taiwan the cost
comes from the producer, while in Japan it comes from the consumer.
The USA is an exception. With no legislation on the EPR principle, it
refuses to impose a burden on the original manufacturer [Wu et al. 2008)]
arguing that this model is not appropriate to keeping the lowest social
cost.

The take-back model
There are three EPR take-back models: original equipment manufacturer
(OEM), pool and third-party take-back. The OEM take-back model is an
EPR system in which the OEM themselves take physical and economic
responsibility for the products they have manufactured. In the pooled
take-back model the physical and economic responsibilities for products
are assumed by consortia of manufacturers, usually grouped by product
category. The third-party take-back model is an alternative approach
where private companies assume EoL responsibilities for products on
behalf of the OEM. In such cases the OEM pays a fee to a product responsibility provider, who then undertakes to ensure that the manufacturer’s
products are retired in a way that is environmentally responsible and
compliant with EPR legislation. The basis and standards underlying these
models and their effects have been compared. The OEM take-back model
has an advantage in feedback, since the manufacturers are simply directly
responsible for their own products at EoL. Therefore, this is more feasible for big companies than small ones, but it raises a barrier of scale for
small companies and cannot resolve the problem of orphaned products,
while the pooled take-back system can address the issues on orphaned
products. However, it is impossible for pooled systems to gather feedback
from economic indicators and achieve the goal of sharing information
and closed-loop recycling. In contrast, the third-party take-back model
has advantages for both manufacturers and the general public and
appears to be a promising approach in optimizing product design, specialization, immediate economic feedback and demanufacturing market
development (Spicer and Johnson 2004; Zhong and Schiller 2009).

China’s implementation of extended producer responsibility
China takes the long view in the exploration and practice of e-waste
recycling. Government agencies deployed four national pilot projects for
WEEE recycling and management between 2003 and 2005, in Beijing,
Tianjin, Qingdao and Hangzhou. The typical process of Chinese legislation is to first formulate lower level ordinances and regulations, then to
gather detailed information in pilot studies, and finally, to draft a national
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law on a particular issue (Yang 2007). Legislation relating to e-waste
recycling includes “The People’s Republic of China Solid Waste Pollution
Prevention and Control Law”, “The People’s Republic of China Cleaner
Production Promotion Law”, “Discarded Household Appliances and
Electronic Products Pollution Control Technology Policy”, “Electronic
Information Products Pollution Control Regulations”, the recent “Subsidy Program for the Replacement of Household Appliances” and the forthcoming “Waste Electrical and Electronic Product Recycling Regulations”.
Although we may glimpse EPR concepts in these regulations, as at the
time of writing there has still been no clear definition of EPR practice in
China. As a result, as far as collection and recycling networks are concerned, very slow progress has been made, and this has become a bottleneck to recycling. The key obstacle is that the costs are higher than they
are when EEE is collected informally. In other words, it lacks a coordinating mechanism to stimulate and engage all parties involved in the recycling process.
In current conditions it is not realistic for China to aim at the voluntary implementation of EPR. In addition to a legal obligation, the country needs the help of third-party take-back economic methods to push for
the adoption of EPR, especially if this is an efficient profit model involving integrative, systematic optimum mechanism design to realize efficiency in recycling e-waste.

Building an extended producer responsibility third-party
e-waste recycling system
Overall framework
In response to the existing problem and in accordance with the principles
of standard recycling, scientific classification, specialized disposal and the
harmless reuse of products, this chapter develops a model of a scientific
e-waste recycling system (EWRS), addressing both the collection and disposal of e-waste. This system, as a third-party recycling organization, aims
to engage the interests of all stakeholder: producers, consumers, government, retailers and disposal sites; and achieve the dynamic control and
management of all the relevant processes by applying an e-commerce
platform (see Figure 9.1.).

Analysis of the stakeholders in the recycling platform
All recycling systems comprise a reverse supply chain. A system mechanism design should coordinate all stakeholders, whose responsibilities and
obligations in the platform are discussed later in this chapter.
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Figure 9.1 EPR Third-party e-commerce recycling system framework

The consumer, a supplier of e-waste, plays an important role in the
r everse supply chain. Therefore, motivating the consumer is the key to
the recycling platform operations. The system should take into account
the consumer’s bargaining power in order to avoid the deal failure. In
particular, the recycling price should be based on analysis of the demand
by interviewing consumers.
The recycling centre, as the provider of product and the reverse supply
chain plan, has a close relationship with the original manufacturers
through a contract with the principle agent. It receives e-waste collection
and recycling fees from these producers together with government sub
sidies, and gathers revenues from the second-hand market by selling
refurbished products. The core tasks of the recycling centre are to take a
reasonable inventory, realize management scalability and maintain sustainable business.
The producer, as the EPR performer, is the real heart of the recycling
system. On the one hand, from the viewpoint of a restraint mechanismbased contract of commission, the producer must pay a disposal fee in
accordance with the complexity of disassembly of a particular product.
As a result, producers will naturally be motivated to improve their product design. At the same time, from the standpoint of motivation, the government should offer subsidies and a refund mechanism or encourage
compliance via a carbon tax, in order to encourage producers to fulfil
their social responsibility.
The government, as the agent of enforcement, must focus on making
efficient policies that provide incentives to producers, consumers and
recyclers simultaneously in all the recycling systems in the large-scale
control process. For instance, central government can focus on making

THIRD-PARTY E-WASTE RECYCLING SYSTEM IN CHINA

143

policies for allocating funds for subsidies and creating standards and objectives, together with supervising the EPR system.

Recycling system process design
Using an online system, consumers will submit the e-waste information,
including the product category, brand, model, purchase date and its current condition via the internet or over the phone. The system will then
automatically generate a list of the items to be recycled, which will be
picked up by professionals from a third-party recycler. The recycling price
will be decided by the special assessing system. After the transaction, the
third-party recycler will pay the consumer over the internet or in cash.
The e-waste will then be transferred to an e-waste recycling centre, a
third firm dedicated to recovering reusable materials from EoL products
and selling them in second-hand markets. Once it has been delivered to
the recycling centre, the e-waste will first be inspected to determine
whether it can be repaired or should be disassembled. Repaired products
could be sold in second-hand markets, while disassembled EoL products
will be separated into reusable, recyclable and disposable materials, sending each to its appropriate inventory. The reusable and recycling components will be tested for their usability potential before they are sent to a
producer or retailer, and the disposable components will be sent to the dis
posal site (see Figure 9.2). At the same time, the government will provide

Figure 9.2 E-waste recycling process
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the subsidy to the recycling centre or to the producers to realize the EPR
principle.
The way in which the EWRS fulfils the EPR responsibility is the key to
this system. The following two points need to be addressed: how to define
the contract between the producer and the recycling agency and how the
government should help to provide incentives to the producer. In light of
economic realities, the government should assess the producer’s contributions when establishing subsidies for recycling and disposal. Forthcoming
legislation on “Waste Electrical and Electronic Product Recycling Regulations” clearly proposes that the government establish the foundation
for the subsidy of recycling WEEE, and that both the collection and subsidy guidelines incorporate input from manufacturers, recycling firms and
relevant experts. Therefore, the EPR principle is already involved in the
proposed regulation and needs to be reflected through a reasonable contract and pricing mechanism.

E-waste recycling information system design
The e-waste recycling information system is composed of five modules to
support the functionalities and business operations of the third-party
recycler (Table 9.2). The client management module provides for real-time,
online inquiries for recycling orders and processing information. The
recycling processing module manages the recycling centre and documents
information about the repair, disassembling, refurbishment, recycling and
disposal of electronics. The inventory is maintained in the inventory management module. The information system also includes accounting functionalities to process, analyse, and report and manage costs. The logistics
module collects, processes and presents information to support the reverse
supply chain through which producers become recipients of recycled
items.

Table 9.2 E-waste recycling management information system
Recycling

Inventory management

Accounting

Logistics

Client order
processing
Recycling centre
management
Disposed
products
management

Inventory monitoring

Cost analysis

Reverse logistics

Stocking and processing

Analysis and
reports

Information
collection

THIRD-PARTY E-WASTE RECYCLING SYSTEM IN CHINA

145

Conclusion
In summary, this proposed e-commerce third-party e-waste recycling system has three benefits for efficient recycling and pollution reduction
within the EPR framework:
• It will strengthen the theoretical system of EPR and explore a performance path for developing economies, offering increased economic
incentives to stimulate all parties to become involved in the recycling
process.
• It will increase recycling efficiency with the help of advanced information technology from the e-commerce information system.
• Using the third-party recycling platform as link, it will balance the
interests of all parties and achieve a win–win situation all around.
Consumer will be able to have their e-waste conveniently recycled and
then receive economic compensation in return. Third-party recyclers
can use the e-commerce platform to collect recycling items on a large
scale and generate profits by disassembling and refurbishing them.
Manufacturers can fulfil their social responsibilities and improve their
corporate image by taking partial financial responsibility for the recycling process according to contracts between them and the third-party
recyclers. The government will regulate the behaviour of all parties
through policies and regulations and thus promote societal sustainable
development, as well as peaceful coexistence between human beings
and the environment.
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